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THE PROCESS AND OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
by
T.M. OCRAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Studies on negotiations as a subject tend to fall into four basic types. One
category centers on the analysis of issues or topics that feature most often in
the sphere of activity covered by the particular area of negotiations; the aim
being to deepen technical knowledge of those subjects and thereby increase the
negotiating capacity of prospective negotiators.
In the specific area of multinational corporations (MNC's), the technical
issues often raised in the investment negotiation process would include the tax
systems of both home and host states of the investment; methods of project ap-
praisal, aimed at ascertaining the viability of the project and ensuring more
favorable economic and social rates of return; transfer pricing and other
restrictive business practices; the corporate structure of the project and its im-
plications for corporate policy-making, financing and management; financial
arrangements, including foreign exchange regulations; transfer of technology,
employment and labor relations; and problems of the applicable law and
machinery for the settlement of disputes.'
A second category of studies consists of historical studies of particular
negotiations which essentially seek to describe the process and outcome of
those negotiations, with little attempt at formulating general propositions that
can be used to explain or predict other negotiations.'
A third category seeks to identify or outline background factors affecting
the relative bargaining position of the parties and thereby shaping the struc-
ture of the distribution of gains arising from the common enterprise.' One ap-
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law, LL.B., B.L. (Ghana); M.L.I., Ph.D.
(Wisconsin).
'See D.N. SMITH & L.T. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD-WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS (1975); UNCTC,
Strengthening the Negotiating Capacity of Developing Countries (March 23, 1979); UNECA, TNC's and
the Excessive Outflow of Financial Resources from Developing African Countries (Working Paper No. 3,
. 1979); UNECA, The Impact of TNC's in the Aluminum Industry in Ghana (Working Paper No. 4, 1979);
UNECA, Activities of TNCs in the Cocoa Industry in Ghana (Working Paper No. 5, 1979); UNECA, Pro-
duction and Marketing of Coffee in Burundi (Working Paper No. 6, 1979); UNECA, Report on Transna-
tional Corporations Activity in the Bauxite Industry of Sierra Leone (Working Paper No. 7, 1979); UNECA,
TNC's in the Copper Industry in Zaire (Working Paper No. 9, 1979); UNECA, TNC's and Primary Com-
modities in Africa (Working Paper No. 10, 1979).
'See J. FAYERWEATHER & A. KAPOOR, STRATEGY AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORA.
TION (1976); S. ALLARD, RUSSIA AND THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY (1970); R.J. TERCHEK, THE MAKING OF
THE TEST BAN TREATY (1970); N. BALOBKINS, WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS TO ISRAEL (197 1).
'See Z. MIKDASH. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1976); I.W. ZARTMAN IED.j THE
POLITICS OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1971).
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proach within this category involves attempts at postulating some general
propositions or hypotheses for analyzing or explaining the outcome of negotia-
tions in general, based on empirical evidence gathered from specific areas of
bargaining, such as corporate mergers and other take-overs, labor-
management disputes, and international political crises. This approach is not
primarily concerned with the building of models; and such theoretical discus-
sions as take place are essentially intended to construct a system of general
concepts of describing negotiations.'
Another subset within this category is the completely deductive approach
which finds expression in model building,' in which some kind of prediction of
results of negotiations is constructed from a set of behavioral assumptions -
either those generally reflecting properties that are intuitively regarded as fair
or equitable, or assumptions about human behavior that are meant to conform
to some concept of rationality, in particular as this term is understood in con-
ventional economic theory.6 Most of these works are highly mathematical in
their language and constructed with the aim of either using computers to in-
vestigate bargaining games or relying on relatively less complicated analytical
procedures.7 Indeed, there have been so many of such models that some writers
have already constructed a taxomony of bargaining models.'
Then there is the fourth category of studies, which is simply directed at a
knowledge of negotiating style and techniques, and tends towards behavioristic
analyses and considerations.'
This paper has little in common with the levels of abstraction and
sophistication of the model building approach within the third category of
negotiation studies. The basic problem with such models based on rational
4See A. LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION (1966); 0. YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF FORCE: BARGAIN-
ING DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1968).
'A theoretical model is essentially a mental construct that seeks to explain a phenomenon - the workings of
a system, a process, etc. - by establishing the logical or conceptual relationship between the variables in-
volved. It provides the outlines around which we assemble descriptive information, and it serves a basically
heuristic purpose. M. BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 228 (1962).
"Rationality in this context means that one's behavior is governed by extensive and explicit thought pro-
cesses of an intelligent and purposive individual. Rationality implies that the parties are logical in their
reasoning, that they can state their preference for possible outcomes according to certain criteria, and that
they consider consequences of all alternative courses of action.
'See generally BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION (0. Young ed. 1975); J. CROSS, THE
ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING (1969), A CODDINGTON, THEORIES OF THE BARGAINING PROCESS (1968); T.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTEIN, THEORY OF GAMES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: 1. STAHL, BARGAINING THEORY (1972); J.F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem.
ECONOMETRICA XXI (1953), pp. 128-140; J.C. Harsanyi, Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and
After the Theory of Games, ECONOMETRICA XXIV (1956), pp. 144-157.
'STAHL, supra note 7, at 213-52.
'See G. KENNEDY, MANAGING NEGOTIATIONS (1980); C. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME (1970); W.
MINNICK, THE ART OF PERSUASION (1968); C. LIPTON, GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES AND
STRATEGIES, Background Paper No. 3, WORKSHOP ON MINING LEGISLATION AND MINERAL RESOURCES
AGREEMENTS (1978).
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behavior is the extent to which people actually behave, or can be made to
behave, in a rational manner when negotiating. The theorists themselves ad-
mit that the behavioral assumptions involved in the construction of their
models cannot be controlled in any experimental replication of the negotiating
situation. Many of these models. cannot as yet be made operationlized.
Moreover, the models' assumption of complete preference ordering is often
criticized on the grounds that people are frequently unable or unwilling to
state or explicitly contemplate preferences over two widely different outcomes.
Nonetheless, the models based on rationality are valuable in their own right, in
that by seeking to predict the outcome of negotiations, a rational theory
becomes a useful guide for empirical research. On the other hand, the first
category of studies, which focuses on substantive analyses of negotiating issues
or of sectors, is so fundamental to the acquisition of negotiating skills that it is
best treated separately on a topic-by-topic basis.
The essential purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework
for case studies aimed at outlining the main stages in the process of negotia-
tions; indicating some of the main factors affecting the relative bargaining
position of the parties to negotiations with multinational corporations; and
providing indices for evaluating the resulting structure of the distribution of
gains from the projects contemplated by such negotiations. The paper thus
combines elements from the second, third and fourth categories of studies on
negotiations.
II. NEGOTIATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A. The Concept of Negotiations
Negotiations may be described as a process through which two or more
parties - be they individuals, groups or larger social units such as nations -
interact in developing potential agreements out of divergent view points, so as
to provide guidance and regulation of their future behavior.'"
This characterization of negotiations holds notwithstanding the fact that
the underlying purpose of a particular negotiation may not be agreement at all,
but rather delay or propaganda. Delay forestalls action while one awaits more
favorable circumstances; and propaganda seeks to embarass the other party,
promote positions that public opinion would favor, or to simply avoid the onus
of failing to negotiate. Other discernible functions of negotiation are the
maintenance of contact, deception of the other party, and intelligence gather-
ing." We are here concerned with negotiations aimed at an outcome, for exam-
ple, with those situations involving serious efforts towards agreement. This
may be termed negotiating in good faith.
,J. Sawyer & H. Guetzkow, Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations. in INTERNATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 466 (H. Kelman ed. 1965); ZARTMAN. supra note 3, at 202.
"SAWYER & GUETZKOW. supra note 10, at 468.
Winter, 1985]
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There is a tendency to use "negotiation" and "bargaining" synonymously.
Strictly speaking, however, negotiation is a wider concept than bargaining. It
covers both the processes that take place prior to bargaining, during which the
rules of the latter are established, including such steps as consultation and
dialogues; as well as the bargaining process itself. Bargaining, on the other
hand, more accurately refers to the actual "process of demand formation and
revision which provides the basic mechanism whereby the parties converge
towards an agreement."'" Negotiation thus refers to the whole situation within
which bargaining occurs. Nonetheless, there are aspects of negotiations, such
as negotiating style and techniques, in which the emphasis is appropriately put
on the bargaining process, and where it seems justifiable to equate negotiations
with bargaining.
B. Resort to Negotiations
The above characterization of negotiations assumes the existence of con-
flict or disagreement between the parties, which is expected to be resolved
through negotiations.
A conflict arises when two or more people or groups endeavor to pursue
goals which appear to be mutually inconsistent. 3 To say that the parties are in
conflict is not to suggest that this conflict necessarily concerns their total rela-
tionship. If parties differ on an issue, it does not follow that they have no over-
all or common interest; and negotiations permit these specific conflicts to be
resolved without the over-all relationship between them being jeopardized.
Where two parties are in conflict there are a number of attitudes they may
adopt. They can, for example, decide to ignore the issue and agree to disagree.
But there are costs in disagreeing; and in business relationships, agreeing to
disagree does not help much. The parties may therefore decide to resolve their
conflict through a number of channels.
Conflict resolution, then, is the process by which the parties reconcile
their goals to the extent that they are mutually consistent. The conflict is
deemed to be resolved when the two parties are willing to accept a given posi-
tion, either because the costs of inducing further conflict would outweigh the
benefits of any improved settlement which may result, or because on some
other criterion, they are willing to accept the settlement as fair."' Conflict
resolution does not, however, mean conflict elimination; and the maintenance
of conflict may sometimes be a good thing. Competition between firms, for ex-
ample, or indeed between any forms of organization is often regarded as
"CROSS. supra note 7, at 7.
1"M.B. Nicholson, The Resolution of Conflict. in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 201 (0.
Young ed. 1975).
4NICHOLSON. supra note 13, at 232.
[Vol. 18:3
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beneficial because it enhances efficiency. The point, then, is to devise ways of
improving the means for conflict resolution so as to avoid serious costs.
The process of conflict resolution covers a whole range of activities which
include at one end, dialogue between the parties; at the other extreme, violent
warfare in the case of states and other political groupings. Negotiation falls
somewhere in between these two extremes, but it is by no means the only form
of peaceful conflict resolution. 5 For one thing, the resolution can be dictated
by one party to another; and if that second party accepts the right or the might
of the other party to decide matters unilaterally, then negotiation has no place
in their relationship. Again, one party may simply succeed in persuading the
other to accept his point of view, with no costs and no quidpro quo to himself.
However, persuasion in isolation seldom achieves success, and is usually en-
countered as an integral part of the negotiating process.
There is also the possibility of dispute-settlement through court litigation;
and this is not really negotiation, because the procedure is laid down and the
solution of the conflict determined by the court must then be accepted by the
parties. Similarly, the settlement of a dispute by arbitration is not negotiation,
even though the disputants agree initially to plead their cases before the ar-
bitrator. Here a third party is empowered to make a binding decision for the
parties, whether they like it or not. Similarly, the resolution of conflict by
chance methods such as tossing a coin is not negotiation. On the other hand,
there is the method of mediation, where a third party simply uses his services
to help in the process of bargaining but does not set up an actual conflict
resolution procedure. This may be regarded as part of the negotiating process.
Notwithstanding the fact that negotiation is not the only method of con-
flict resolution, it is still one of the most commonly used because of the
peculiar circumstances in which the parties often find themselves.
All types of negotiations have one thing in common: the parties involved
have varying degrees of power, but not absolute power, over each other to
force a decision. In circumstances where one person has total control over
another, it may indeed be tempting to dispense with negotiations. In other cir-
cumstances, the outcome of the conflict is such that it does not depend on one
party alone and calls for interdependent decision-making through negotiations.
Oran Young refers to this necessary interdependence as "strategic interaction,"
that is regarded as central to all situations involving bargaining.'" Secondly,
negotiations are more likely where there is a balance of advantage between the
costs of agreeing and disagreeing; that is, as long as both parties consider that
the benefits of resolving the conflict through negotiations are greater than the
"KENNEDY. supra note 9, at 4-6.
'Young describes strategic interaction as "the set of behaviour [sic] patterns manifested by individuals
whose choices are interdependent, in the sense that the outcomes associated with their choices are partially
controlled by each other." YOUNG. supra note 7, at 6.
Winter, 19851
5
Ocran: Negotiations With ultinational Corporations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
AKRON LAW REVIEW
likely benefits of resolving it through some other means." If the evaluation of
prospective outcomes is favorable, negotiation will generally ensue. Thirdly,
for negotiations to succeed the parties must be willing to move from stated
positions and manifest the will to negotiate in spite of the difficulties. It follows
that a unilateral recitation of requests, complaints and charges is not negotia-
tion, but only a presentation of petitions.
C. Bargaining Objectives
We have asserted that negotiations basically arise because the parties per-
ceive a potential pay-off or gain which they will gain only by reaching an
agreement among themselves. If a party were convinced that he could manage
on his own resources or through another arrangement to obtain a pay-off high-
er or better than that suggested by the proposed agreement, he would probably
not enter into negotiations at all; or would seek ways of breaking them off if he
has already entered into them. Yet, although the sum of goods or values ex-
pected to be brought into being by agreement is assumed to be larger than the
amount available to a party beforehand, it is also reasonable to assume that the
positive sum is not large enough to cover the wants of both parties.
Hence the objective of each party in actual negotiations is to maximize his
gains from the over-all pay-off at the expense of the other. Negotiations may
thus be viewed as the pursuit of the twin and often contradictory goals of max-
imizing one's own pay-off and reaching a group agreement or as a process
through which the various individual interests are gradually transformed into
one group interest within the framework of an agreement. The concept of
gains requires some elaboration. It refers to all the positive effects of the ven-
ture excluding its negative externalities. Financial gains cover one aspect and
refer to the quantum of revenue from the project, including foreign exchange
proceeds, taking into account their absolute size or value, and costs incurred
by the domestic economy in earning them. And the distribution of gains
describes the structure or formula by which the gains from the project are
eventually divided among the interested parties.
D. How Negotiations with MNC's Arise
There are three basic ways in which host countries initially assume legal
obligations leading to the establishment of a MNC project within its borders.
The host state may become a party to a specific agreement arising out of
negotiations in respect of a particular project and tailored for that project. An
example would be a fairly detailed agreement covering various phases of a min-
ing venture - mining, processing, marketing etc.. This option is often the
result of perceived inadequacies of the general laws dealing with all requisite
"KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 3-10; SAWYER & GUETZKOW. supra note 10, at 473.
'"THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT (P. Swingle ed. 1970).
[Vol. 18:3
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aspects of foreign investment in the country. On the other hand, the state may
simply assume obligations under a standard agreement whereby the pro-
cedures have been standardized in respect of all undertakings falling within its
sphere, and hence raises no real need for formal negotiations. A forestry or
mining prospecting concession falls into this category. Thirdly, the state may
assume obligations arising from the operations of the general laws applicable
to foreign investment project operating under a statute embodying generally
applicable fiscal incentives.
It is the first type of situation that calls into play the full force of negotia-
tions. The main advantage in this approach of case by case negotiations
leading to specific contracts is the recognition that each project may be suffi-
ciently distinct from others to warrant individual treatment. Moreover, the
built-in flexibility of negotiations makes it possible for the host government to
strike a bargain by taking into consideration such constantly changing
variables as technological advances, volume of world production, and market
conditions of the particular commodity.
Generally, renegotiations are warranted if there has been a fundamental
change of circumstances; as, for example, where the fundamental economic
basis of the agreement has dramatically altered in view of current world
market prices and other relevant economic indicators ("clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus"). The constantly changing would economic situation explains the cur-
rent attitude of many host states to press for the insertion of renegotiation
clauses in the original agreement. Protracted persuasions on the MNC to
negotiate become unnecessary if renegotiation clauses had previously been ex-
pressly stipulated. 9
Such clauses may apply to only specific areas or topics in the agreement;
or they may affect the entire substance thereof, as for example, when it is
stipulated that the parties would meet to consider periodically whether the
agreement is operating fairly for each side, and, if not, to use their best
endeavors to make requisite changes. However, the need for express renegotia-
tion clauses may be obviated by such built-in mechanisms as a stipulation of
precise formulas for periodic automatic adjustments in the financial and fiscal
aspects of the agreement ("escalation clauses"); or the insertion of most-
favored-nation clauses, the ultimate effect of which is to set in motion a
renegotiation of the agreement when the requisite conditions have been
satisfied, since such favorable concessions cannot be mechanically determined
and applied.20 On the whole, one would say that the principle of renegotiation
There are, however, many host states which disapprove of express renegotiation clauses on the grounds
that they can be unduly restrictive, since they exclude review until certain specified conditions have been
met (e.g. a lapse of 5-7 years). Hence they prefer to reserve their sovereign prerogative to call for renegotia-
tions whenever political and economic exigencies so demand.
'On renegotiations of MNC agreements generally, see ASANTE. Stability of Contractual Relations in the
Transnational Investment Process, INTL & COMP. L.Q. 401-23 (July, 1979).
Winter, 19851
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is becoming increasingly acceptable by MNC's, even if they still have reserva-
tions about express stipulations to the effect. As an MNC commits itself more
and more to the resources of a given country, it seems less likely that it would
refuse outright to renegotiate an agreement which turns out to be inadequate
from the host country's standpoint.
On the other hand, a particular MNC may refuse to renegotiate the
original agreement or renegotiations, once initiated, may break down. The
host state may then resort to the third approach, namely, nationalization. Na-
tionalization may, of course, occur without previous attempts at renegotia-
tions. This happens when a government resorts to it as a matter of principle, or
as a result of events of an ad hoc nature. But unless nationalization is con-
fiscatory in nature, it may yet entail a certain amount of negotiations which
are likely to center on such issues as the adequacy and mode of payment of
compensation. It may also include negotiations on a new form of relationship
between the two parties once the equity relationship is terminated, for exam-
ple, the conclusion of management, technology or marketing contracts with
the nationalized set-up. Hence negotiations with MNCs can arise both at the
pre-establishment and post-entry stages of their operations.
III. THE BARGAINING PROCESS:
PREPARATION STRATEGIES, TECHNIQUES,
AND OUTCOME
Negotiations may be regarded as consisting of five aspects or clauses of
variables:2' (a) goals (or objectives), which motivate the parties to enter and sus-
tain the negotiation; (b) the bargaining process itself, which involves com-
munications and actions leading to (c) certain outcomes or results for each par-
ty; all occurring within and influenced by (d) pre-existing background factors
of traditions and relations between the parties; and (e) specific situational con-
ditions under which the bargaining is conducted. Goals and the background
factors are antecedent to the bargaining process; that process and the situa-
tional conditions are concurrent; and the outcome is consequent thereon.
The bargaining process thus describes the actual process by which the
terms and conditions of a potential agreement, including the structure of
distribution of gains, are arrived at.
There is thus a sequence of activities in the bargaining process, including:
(i) preliminary negotiation concerning procedure and agenda;
(ii) formulation of alternative positions and priorities in goals.
(iii) communication and persuasion intended to alter the other party's
perception of the situation.22
(iv) outcome or results of the bargaining.
2 SAWYER & GUETZKOW, supra note 10, at 467.
221d. at 472.
[Vol. 18:3
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"Bargaining strategy" is the game plan a party uses to achieve his objec-
tives in negotiations; "techniques" are the individual elements of that strategy;
and "tactics" (or gambits) point to the maneuvers that make up those tech-
niques." We shall proceed to discuss these stages, strategies and techniques in
greater detail.
A. Preparation
Preparation for negotiations consists of what the parties have to do before
arriving at the bargaining table. The amount of time a party puts into prepara-
tion goes a long way in determining his relative bargaining strength, and
preparation is the most consistent guide to negotiating performance. A badly
prepared negotiator can only react to events; he cannot take the initiative. Yet
all too frequently, government officials do not make adequate preparations for
negotiations with MNC's.
1. Feasibility Studies
One cannot overemphasize the importance of feasibility studies, wherever
appropriate, prior to bargaining. Such a study should properly form the basis
for any fiscal regime to be negotiated for the intended project. Where, as some-
times happens, the feasibility study is prepared not before, but after the conclu-
sion of a long-term contract, this means that the host government has deter-
mined the elements of the fiscal regime (price of the commodity in question,
tax, royalty etc.) even before it is in a position to assess the economic prospects
of the resource to be exploited, or even the size of the resource in the case of
mineral deposits. Undue advantage is thereby given to the foreign investor.
2. Setting Priorities in Objectives
On each issue for negotiations, a party may have a set of alternative posi-
tions ranging from the position least acceptable to him (the "threshold
position") to that most favorable to him. He would be most lucky to find
himself in a situation in which the other party simply accepts the alternative
that he likes the most. Indeed, quite often he will not succeed in having the
most favorable alternative accepted, however much he may insist on it.
Typically the alternative that is ultimately accepted would lie somewhere
along the line, i.e. a compromise solution, or an agreement on an alternative
which is neither the best nor the worst for either party. The settlement can be
reached anywhere within "the bargaining area" (the area between a party's
most favored position and his break-point). The final position adopted is de-
fined by the relative strength of the parties and by the general background
negotiating factors. The art of negotiation, therefore, is to obtain one's own ob-
jectives to the maximum extent possible and to compromise in those areas
"KENNEDY. supra note 9, at 142.
Winter, 19851
9
Ocran: Negotiations With Multinational Corporations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
AKRON LAW REVIEW
which are of least importance to one's side." There will be areas which will be
of such importance that one party cannot compromise, and other areas in
which there is considerable room for compromise.
Hence, governments should approach negotiations with MNC's with a
thorough understanding of their own interests and those of the other side.
They should also determine the over-all objectives of the negotiation and
decide how important each issue is to the government. These can then be
ordered as a set of priorities.25
Among the objectives, there are those which a particular party feels he
must achieve; and others which he would like to achieve. By definition, the lat-
ter objectives are less basic than the former. They are such that if the party has
to abandon them in order to achieve or protect the "must" objectives, he would
do so willingly.26 One consequence of the failure to establish clear priorities is
that negotiations may start with insistence on minor issues, leading subse-
quently to a softening on more important points so as not to appear obstruc-
tive. The establishment of a set of priorities means that one should develop a
number of fall-back positions as part of the preparation for negotiations.
3. Collecting Information on Other Party
Oran Young has defined information as knowledge about all those factors
which affect the ability of an individual to make choices in a given situation in
such a way as to maximize his utility. 7 Gathering intelligence about the other
party is basic to whatever issue one is negotiating, and it plays a vital part in
outlining one's own objectives. In all the processes of negotiations, information
concerning the weight or value the other party places upon the various possible
outcomes is crucial. Governments should therefore exert every effort to obtain
information on the terms and conditions of comparable agreements entered in-
to by the investor with other governments.
There is often an imbalance of information between governments and
MNC's in that the latter invariably have more detailed and accurate cost and
revenue information about projects, and are also in a better position to make
realistic estimates and projections. This in turn often arises from the fact that
the MNC's have a greater understanding of the particular industry and the
market forces at work. At any rate, there seems to be a built-in problem of ob-
taining complete information on the other party to any negotiations. As each
party seeks to induce the other to go a little down his list of alternative objec-
24 LPrON, supra note 9, at I.
25Unfortunately, in many kinds of negotiations it is not always easy for the parties to know exactly what
they want before-hand. Sometimes the brief of the negotiating agents merely requires them to "get what
they can," and this may only become defined when the negotiations are already under way.
26KENNEDY, supra note 9, at 29-31.
27YOUNG, supra note 7, at 10.
[Vol. 18:3
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tives in order to maximize his gains, it becomes the aim of both parties to con-
trol each other's knowledge of their list of alternatives. Hence we should
assume that there would be imperfect information on the other party in
negotiations. Moreover, the desire for maximum information is always
hamstrung by considerations of the high cost of processing it into relevant in-
formation. Nonetheless, it is important to know all that can be known about
the other party; and also to ensure that the other party knows at the ap-
propriate time what the first party knows about him.
4. Drafting The Proposed Agreement
Each side in negotiations attempts to seize the initiative and to make its
proposals the basis for discussions. It is important that the government
negotiates on its own grounds and that it does not lose control over the pro-
cess. Here the government party, as representatives of the government, has an
inherent advantage.
Governments have sought to frame the negotiating issues by attempting
to provide the first drafts of the agreement themselves. A draft agreement
reflects the basic points of view of the party who prepared it. Thus, that party
sets the terms around which bargaining begins. Hence, the danger in allowing
the MNC to present the initial draft document is that the government may
find it difficult to negotiate away from the general framework and from a large
number of specific provisions reflecting the MNC's point of view.28 Yet the
scarcity of personnel in host countries with the requisite skills, and the time re-
quired to prepare a useful draft, has led many governments to permit the MNC
to submit the draft provisions serving as the basis for negotiation.
Since it seems logically sound at the bargaining table to agree on general
propositions of the agreement before proceeding to specific ones, some drafts-
men prefer the practice of using "heads of agreement" to embody a statement
of the agreed principles before working on detailed annexes. However, there is
no intrinsic virtue in this approach, or for that matter in a short or long draft.
The extent of the detail in an agreement is a function of the practice of in-
dividual governments and foreign investors. The main objective in drafting is
to spell out the agreement reached in sufficient detail so that it is clearly
understood and as many potential points of misunderstanding are eliminated
as is possible. For this reason, it is also important that as few experts as possible
do the actual drafting of the document.29
In some cases, the government negotiators combine the production of the
first draft agreement with opening the project for general bidding, where ap-
propriate, and using the best offer as the basis for negotiations. Indeed, this
nSMITH & WELLS. supra note I, at 156-57.
-'Someone once said that the best drafting committee is a committee of one: the old adage that "'a camel is a
horse designed by a committee" is quoted in support of this position.
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practice has become a general policy in some countries. Where this can be
done effectively - e.g. in industries not characterized by tight obligopolistic
co-operation - the bargaining position of the host country can thereby be
substantially strengthened.
5. Formulating the Agenda
When attention is concentrated upon the question of specifically what is
to be negotiated, it is not only the draft agreement that is to be considered, but
also the agenda for the bargaining table. Starting with proposals from each par-
ty for issues to be negotiated, the parties must jointly decide at the early ses-
sions of the bargaining which matters should constitute the agenda. Since the
choice is critical and influences the outcome of the negotiation itself, the gov-
ernment negotiators should also come up with a draft agenda for the meeting.
The importance of establishing an agenda is that it forces the parties to
determine which policies, principles, problems and issues are worth the most
attention. The exercise also reveals the extent to which the other side is in-
terested in a particular issue. The agenda puts particular provisions of the draft
agreement into perspective and avoids the pitfalls of the clause-by-clause ap-
proach at the bargaining table, in which points of language, punctuation and
other points of minor substantive significance are treated at the expense of ma-
jor issues of policy.
6. The Negotiating Team
Most governments use the team approach in negotiating agreements with
MNC's. This is understandable in view of the variety of subjects which are
often raised in such negotiations: e.g. the differences between cash flow and
profits, the significance of depreciation in relation to profits and cash flow, the
techniques of financing, and other subjects mentioned in the introductory part
of this paper. It therefore becomes necessary to have experts in as many areas
as possible: including financial analysis, accounting, tax, law, engineering,
development economics, and administration.
Since the results of the negotiation will also affect more than one ministry
or department of government, it is usual to find representatives from the dif-
ferent departments on the negotiating team. A few countries group together all
the necessary expertise in a single state agency or ministry which has a virtual
monopoly to negotiate agreements with MNCs. There are advantages in this
idea of one agency as a focal point, in that everything is co-ordinated under
one roof and probably simplifies the investment procedure for the prospective
foreign investor. At any rate, it is always valuable to include on the negotiating
team someone who will be responsible for the administration of the project
after it has been established, so that he fully appreciates the history and import
of the agreement. On the other hand, too many members make an unwieldy
[Vol. 18:3
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team, and in such cases one discovers that the real negotiations take place be-
tween the team leaders and their few allies when they meet outside the
bargaining room. Those entrusted with the composition of the negotiating
team should therefore seek to strike an effective balance between required ex-
pertise and numbers.
In organizing the team, it is important to decide who is to speak for the
government. This will normally be the leader or chairman of the team, and he
in turn may designate those members of the team who are to address particular
issues on the agenda. It is a useful strategy to have a parity of status between
the leaders of the two negotiating teams. If the investor's representative has to
report back to his president or board of directors to obtain approval, then it is
essential that the government too retains the flexibility of having its team
leader report back to his minister to obtain such approval."
The most effective negotiating teams tend to have certain characteristics.
Their membership, no matter the composition, does not vary from negotiating
session to negotiating session. Instead they have a clearly designated chairman
with clearly defined powers; and they have unambiguous authority to con-
clude agreements subject only to executive or legislative approval." When in-
dividual ministries or other agencies are perceived as having the power to
erode the authority of the negotiating team, the team often finds the foreign in-
vestor negotiating directly with those establishments concerned with particular
aspects of the agreement.
One question which often crops up in the composition of the negotiating
team is the role of foreign experts. Where governments perceive weaknesses in
their bargaining, skills, foreign consultants are often called in to assist in for-
mulating general policy or in particular negotiations, or to suggest specific
solutions to individual problems that have already been identified by the local
experts. They may also be of assistance in clarifying objectives, developing a
strategy for negotiation, and preparing back-up papers and fall-back positions.
A basic issue raised here is whether such foreign consultants should be
used at all, considering the possibilities of conflict of loyalties as well as dif-
ferences in perspectives between them and the host country on political and
ideological goals. In any case, the resort to foreign experts must be seen as no
more than a temporary measure, intended to bridge the gap while the training
of local expertise is accelerated. Foreign consultants, if they are to be used at
all, should hardly be appointed as official members of the government
negotiating team. They should take the backroom position of clarifying issues
and preparing position papers.
Once the team has been empanelled, it is necessary to brief them on the
"LIPTON. supra note 9, at 4-5.
"SMITH & WELLS. supra note I, at 166.
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tasks they are to perform. We have already mentioned the role of the leader,
who is to do most of the speaking and generally to lead the negotiation towards
a conclusion. There must be someone on the team assigned with the task of re-
cording the arguments of both sides and the agreement reached on particular
issues. Such a person is often the legal or technical specialist. He will normally
remain silent throughout the negotiations unless called upon to answer a direct
question.
B. The Bargaining Table
As part of the over-all strategy of seeking to negotiate on its own grounds,
the government party should produce a first draft, control the agenda, and
determine the procedure. In this way the order of presentation of points would
be that selected by the government, and the other side would be forced to
negotiate the government's proposals, and not the other way around.
However, in order to make any progress at all in any negotiations, the
arguments and proposals of each party must, of course, be communicated to
the other. The central forum for this is the bargaining table, which is the most
intense part of the bargaining process. It calls for mutual exchanges; and it
consists of arguments and counter-arguments, proposals and counter-
proposals, all directed towards reaching agreement on actions and outcomes
mutually perceived as beneficial. The communication implied in this move-
ment is intended to alter the other party's perception of the situation, and in-
cludes resort to all sorts of strategies and techniques, including persuasion
through threats and promises,fait accomplis, and other actions aimed at nar-
rowing or widening the range of available outcomes and alternatives.
We shall now discuss some of the strategies commonly employed at
various phases of the bargaining table, as well as the negotiating techniques or
tactics typically called into play at that level.
1. General Strategies at Bargaining Table
(a) Making and Receiving Proposals
At the bargaining table, the various propositions and arguments which
the parties may have previously advanced are now reduced into concrete pro-
posals, which can then be negotiated. Arguments by themselves cannot be
negotiated. One party sets the ball rolling by spelling out its proposals on a
given issue according to the agenda. There is sometimes advantage in asking
the other side to speak first, but this largely depends much on the situation.
Speakers must be conscious of their choice of words. The importance of
language here lies in the fact that some words have different meanings in dif-
ferent cultures, especially in translation, and that the speaker does not wish to
be needlessly misunderstood or offensive.
[Vol. 18:3
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Ideally, only one person should be responsible for making proposals and
agreeing to compromises. While others may be allowed to speak in their own
areas of competence, the team leader should be the one with power to commit
the government, in the case of the government team. There should never be
occasion for dissension demonstrated in the ranks of the team. Arguments
among team members should be reserved for recesses out of the hearing of the
other party. When open disagreements occur among government negotiators,
the foreign investor tends to select, as his allies, those government represen-
tatives who support him on a particular issue. The strength of the negotiating
team is thereby eroded.
A most useful strategy in handling proposals and counter proposals is to
summarize the position being advanced. This helps people to concentrate on
the business on the table, and reminds everybody of what is going on. When
receiving proposals, it is neither wise nor proper to interrupt the other person
from stating his case. In the process of interrupting him, one may miss
something beneficial which was about to be proposed; and, in any case, people
resent being interrupted.
It is a common strategy in negotiations to present a list of proposals con-
sisting of demands, objections and requirements to be followed by the sugges-
tion that they are all dealt with at one time. One should beware of the error of
treating the issues piecemeal. It is essential to keep all the issues in dispute
linked up to the bargaining step and treated as a package.
It may be impolitic to engage in instant rejection of the other party's pro-
posals. Even when the idea is absolutely unacceptable to one's side, it is best to
treat it and its proposer with some respect. There are other ways of rejecting
the proposal which are less likely to antagonize the other party. It is best to
listen to the proposal, ask for clarification on any points which are not clear,
and then either ask for time to consider it or, if one is well prepared, give a con-
sidered response to it.
On the other hand, if one is faced with a blanket "no" to one's own pro-
posals, an attempt should be made to present alternatives rather than give up
immediately. But this strategy must not be overdone to the point of encourag-
ing the other to reject one's offers in the hope that more acceptable alternatives
will be readily forthcoming.
(b) Communication and Persuasion
As already noted, the communication implied in bargaining is intended to
alter the other party's perception of the situation. Communication itself is not
always direct; quite often in negotiations there is communication through sig-
nalling. Signals are indirect messages which consist of qualifications placed on
statements of positions. If, for example, instead of simply saying to the other
party, "We will never agree to what you are proposing," one were to add "in its
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present form," the addition would suggest to the other side that if he were to
amend his proposals in some way, there would be the possibility of an agree-
ment.
The aim of persuasion in communication is to alter the other party's
perception of the situation. To persuade the other party to accept a proposed
term, one must provide him with the motivation to accept. This can be done
either by showing the other party that it is in fact in his interest to do so, or by
offering him an incentive to accept that proposal. Persuasion thus involves
threats and promises. A threat is a representation that if another party acts in a
way one disfavors, one will take an action detrimental to that party. On the
other hand, promises are representations that if the other party behaves in a
way one favors, one will then take an action beneficial to the other. 2
(c) Flexibility and Firmness
The question of how far to make concessions at the bargaining table
always arises in negotiations. This is related to the issues of flexibility as op-
posed to firmness. Some believe that it is important to make concessions in
order to keep up the tempo of negotiations, or in order to keep a positive at-
mosphere. But economic realities and other pressures should dictate the point
at which a negotiator compromises. Before making concessions, it is useful to
ask the questions: "What is the concession worth to my opponent? What does
it cost me? What do I want in exchange?" A good working principle on conces-
sions is not to give away anything without getting something in return.
These considerations indeed boil down to the choice between firmness
and flexibility in negotiations. Flexibility enables the negotiator to revise ex-
pectations upwards as well as downwards, and if one has not been overly firm
on a specific issue, it is easy to revise one's position in the light of the other
side's flexibility. At the same time, flexibility can remove all the negotiating
cards one may be carrying. The more flexibility one displays on every issue, the
more the other side gets the impression that one does not really value one's
position very highly. Consequently, the other side may increase his stubborn-
ness in response to one's flexibility. A good working rule is to be firm on
generalities and flexible on specifics in the opening rounds of the bargaining.
This gives more room for maneuver.
(d) Adjournments
The main purpose of an adjournment is to review and assess progress
against one's prepared objectives and one's estimate of the other party's objec-
3SAWYER & GUETZKOW. supra note 10, at 483. A distinction may be made between deterrent and compellent
threats. The former involves commitments to retaliate in the event that the other side carries out a specified
action. Compellent threats, by contrast, are based on commitments to punish the other side in the event that
he does not carry out a desired act. T. SCHELLING. ARMS AND INFLUENCE 69-78 (1966).
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tives. Hence adjournments are partially repreparation sessions for the
reconvened meeting. They may be taken for consideration of or for such
necessaries as eating and sleeping. But equally important, adjournments pro-
vide the negotiators with the opportunity to consider whether or not to make
concessions. During the recess, the compromises and new points are con-
sidered. The team leader is given appropriate advice as to the consequences
and the effects on other points in the negotiating position."
The number and frequency of adjournments will depend upon the normal
practice of negotiators in the given environment and business. However, a
wrongly timed adjournment can actually weaken the pressure upon the other
side. By the time the session is reconvened, the other side may have had a sec-
ond thought or even new instructions.
(e) Staying Power in Negotiations
There is a tendency for some negotiators to start by rattling off a list of
demands and requests, and then to recoil or even give up negotiations when
rebuffed by the other party. However it should be remembered that bargaining
involves exchanges hopefully leading to an agreement. This calls for great stay-
ing power on the part of negotiators. Moreover, since negotiating strength may
alter throughout the course of negotiations, there is an obvious need for well-
organized, continuously available, back-up services.
(f) Publicity
Publicity in negotiations should generally be avoided. Premature publicity
almost invariably works to the disadvantage of the government officials con-
ducting the negotiations. Occasionally, publicity frightens the investor, leads
to public criticism and to expectations which can only lead to disappointments.
Progress reports are useful, and the texts of press releases agreed upon by both
sides could be issued. However, on the whole it is best to give full publicity to
negotiations only after a final agreement has been reached, or the negotiations
permanently broken off.
2. Common Negotiating Techniques
There are standard tactics which are practiced with sufficient frequency
at the bargaining table, among which are the following. 4 Some so-called bar-
gaining techniques are unplanned and may simply be natural reactions based
on the personality of the negotiator, others may result from a deliberate deci-
sion to use them as a strategic weapon in dealing with the other party. It is the
latter approach that constitutes negotiating techniques in the real sense. In
33KENNEDY. supra note 9, at 78; LIPTON, supra note 9, at 3.
'4The terminology adopted in describing these tactics or techniques are largely those of, KENNEDY. supra
note 9; UPTON. supra note 9.
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general, the relevance or effectiveness of some of these techniques depends on
the cultural environment and the natural characteristics of the negotiators for
different cultures react differently to approach and style.
(a) Threats
The use of threats as a tactic amounts to stating that unless the other par-
ty concedes what one wants, there will be resort to some sanction which that
other party does not really relish. For threats to be effective, however, the
threatened party should be convinced that the detrimental action will not be
taken if he complies; and that the threat is credible, in the sense that the threat
giver is perceived as having the means to carry out his threat. But the latter
perception itself depends in part on the credulity of the threatened party.
A familiar form of threat during bargaining is the walk-out threat. This
can be very effective when used by the MNC negotiating team, particularly
when the government team is led by a civil servant who is then faced with the
unhappy prospect of having to explain the failure of a project on which so
much hope has been laid by the national authorities.
In using threats, it is essential to separate what one needs to state in order
to underline one's credibility from what one may be tempted to overstate,
thereby risking the calling of one's bluff. In general, it is not wise to threaten,
unless one is prepared to carry out the threat; for once the bluff is called, it
might be difficult to regain credibility.
(b) Fait Accompli
This tactic attempts to reduce the available options by eliminating certain
outcomes and alternatives. The effect is that the party who is the target is left
with a situation in which his best outcomes are eliminated, and the least
undesirable of the remainder are just the ones preferred by the initiating party.
(c) Brinkmanship and Intransigence
Brinkmanship describes the situation in which a bargainer expects his op-
ponent to make a definite concession at some point in the future, and, in light
of this, is prepared to wait, making no concessions himself. It is a particular
case of intransigence, in which a party expects to obtain agreement on his ini-
tial terms, anticipating that the other party will make all of the concessions.
(d) Non-negotiable Terms
Closely related to the tactic of intransigence is that which presents certain
proposals as "non-negotiable." Falling within the same category is the "man-
date demand," in which the other party is told that one is under instructions to
get this or that, and that there are no instructions to do otherwise. Quite often,
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however, the non-negotiable stance arises, not as a ploy from the negotiators
themselves, but in conformity with principles enunciated by the head of
government or minister, or embodied in legislation.
(e) Delay
Deliberate delay in agreeing to a point is a common tactic. The question is
to decide at what point one should be reasonable and how long one should
maintain his position. While this is a useful technique, it should be
remembered that delay can cut both ways. In the case of mineral agreements,
for example, it may be to the government's advantage, particularly where
significant exploration costs have been incurred and a feasibility report paid
for by the investor, to put pressure on the latter by spreading out the negotia-
tion while the investor watches the anticipated costs escalate beyond his pro-
jections. On the other hand, governments may have already planned for the
use of the expected revenues from the project so that any delay from the in-
vestor can hurt rather badly.
(f) Public Propaganda
It is possible to increase one's bargaining position by deliberately creating
a favorable public opinion through statements calculated to arouse sentiments
admitting of no concessions in certain areas. A government may, for example,
announce that it is about to enter into negotiations on a mineral agreement
from which it expects favorable results, some of which might even be spelled
out in detail in press statements. The Government would then argue at the bar-
gaining table that because the public expects it to negotiate certain terms, it
can accept nothing less. A related gambit is to attempt to convince the other
party that he would earn bad publicity if he were to pursue a certain course of
action.
(g) Fairness and Stability
Pursuant to this strategy, the host country persuades the MNC investor
that the stability of their agreement rests upon the public's perception of the
fairness of the terms. This tactic must be used with restraint however as the
MNC investor will conclude that the agreement is possibly unstable despite
numerous government assurances.
(h) Dangerous Precedent
Yet another tactic, linked to the "public opinion" idea, is for the
negotiator to explain his inability to accept a certain request from the other
party by arguing that if he agreed to that particular demand, he would find
himself in a position of having to do so to all other parties, which he could not
afford to do. This tactic is often called into play because of the possible inser-
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tion of most-favored company or most-favored country provisions in invest-
ment agreements.
(i) Lack of Authority
A negotiating party may obtain an advantage by pretending to have less
power than he actually has. His principals may also reinforce this pretense of
limited authority, or lack of authority, by deliberately giving him instructions
which are difficult or impossible to change, and making sure that the other par-
ty understands the situation. From the government standpoint, this technique
may avoid the problem of premature commitment and also the embarrassment
of finding the government committed only to have the MNC announce that its
board of directors insist on one additional point.
6) Pre-conditions
A party may declare that he has pre-conditions which must be met if he is
to negotiate on some disputed issue. These pre-conditions, which are really
"short-gun" tactics, are aimed at weakening the bargaining power of the other
party; for the idea is to force the latter to modify his position even before
negotiations begin.
(k) Bluffing
This amounts to demanding more than the bluffing participant really ex-
pects to obtain from the other party. An investor may also bluff by referring to
a project as being of marginal importance to his over-all investment plans. A
variation of this tactic is to give the impression that one has much better pro-
posals from the other party's competitors, in the hope of persuading the latter
to increase the attractiveness of his offer. But the danger of bluffing in any
negotiation is that the bluff may be called. Basically bluffing involves the in-
tention to advance a sham bargaining position, for example, making demands
which are too high, that the other party considers less favorable than his
minimum expectation. Advantage may accrue if the other's minimum disposi-
tion is initially lower than was thought, or if it simply succeeds in lowering that
other party's minimum disposition. On the other hand, it may be difficult to
obtain public support for extreme positions and, in any case, the other party
may consider that agreement is impossible and discontinue negotiation.
Closely allied to bluffing through advancing a sham bargaining position is
the tactic of deliberately presenting two bad alternative proposals to the other
side, one of which is worse than the other. The opponent is then intimidated to
accept the other in order to avoid the more horrific proposal. But this tactic
may be counter productive, since it can provoke the other party to surface with
his own equally extreme alternatives.
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(I) Deception and Lies
A party may go further than mere bluffing. He may indulge in outright
lies or deception in order to give the other party a false perception of the situa-
tion he seeks to regulate. A variation of this attitude is to deliberately paint the
picture so black or so alarmingly that the other party feels he must accept the
changes being proposed, or face certain doom.
(m) Linking the Issues
Earlier this author suggested that it is a good idea for a party to link up his
proposals and see them as a package. However, the same approach, adopted by
the other party, can turn out to be a dangerous tactic. He may start negotia-
tions from a position of weakness on some issues. His strategy then would be
to link the issues on which he is weak with others on which he feels stronger.
One must watch out for this type of maneuver.
(n) Salami Tactic
The tactic here is to introduce an arrangement a bit at a time and over a
relatively long period, so that there will be less resistance from those affected."
(o) Tough Guy, Nice Guy
Here, one member of a negotiating party opens the negotiations with a
very hard line on an issue ("tough guy"). He is then followed by another
member of his team who puts forward a more reasonable view in comparison
with the first speaker, though his position may still not be acceptable to the
other party ("nice guy"). The temptation is thus created to accept the nice
guy's version as the lesser of two evils. The "tough guy" part is therefore often
played to establish a high negotiating platform, thereby creating negotiating
room for the nice guy.
But this tactic has risks for the user. If the "tough guy" part is overdone, it
may provoke rather than intimidate. On the other hand, if the nice guy comes
in too early, he may increase the opponent's confidence because the planned
softening of the attitude might be interpreted as a response to the opponent's
reaction to the tough guy's performance. This will in turn encourage the oppo-
nent to resist new proposals.
A variation of the "nice guy" tactic is that of referring to the senior offi-
cials, to whom the government and the MNC negotiating teams respectively
report, as being very difficult; the intention here being to make the other side
negotiate with the man across the table than the "unreasonable" bosses at head
office.
"
31t is called the Salami tactic because, like salami, it comes in thin slices and is not eaten at one go, lest it
become unpalatable. KENNEDY. supra note 9.
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(p) Split the Difference
Here the investor's team would ask the Government team to be
reasonable and meet them half-way, so that the investor would retain a certain
level of profits and other advantages. The trap here is that the Government
may already have given out a figure in a spirit of compromise. There is
therefore no further "splitting of the difference" to be done. This tactic merely
encourages both parties to always ask for more than it is ready to accept, and
to keep its distance in the bargaining.
What all these bargaining tactics or techniques have in common is the at-
tempt to generate and exploit uncertainties in the other party's thinking about
the nature of the situation; and thereby to affect the outcome of the negotia-
tions.
C. Outcome
Out of the process of bargaining emerges a specified outcome. The form
of these outcomes vary from formal to informal and often vague understand-
ings to a virtual lack of agreement in some cases. But let us assume that there is
agreement.
Agreements cover formal treaties, executive agreements, explicit but in-
formal understandings such as side letters as well as tacit but informal
understandings. Side letters as a form of agreement call for comment. Some ex-
perts question the legal validity of such documents, that is, the extent to which
they are binding on the parties. Others attack them on moral or political
grounds, that is, the propriety of the government covering up part of the agree-
ment reached with the investor. 6
Whatever form the agreement takes, there is an interface between it and
the applicable general laws and regulations. The development of contractual
terms covering foreign investment activities is rarely confined to the bargain-
ing table. The applicable general laws and the provisions of the agreement will
in turn be amplified and clarified by administrative regulations, which will also
fill the gap on matters on which the agreement is silent or vague. The expected
use of regulations must therefore be taken into account in the outcome of
negotiations.
Formal considerations of the agreement aside, there is always an impor-
tant question as to how "good" the outcome is, and in what sense this may be
evaluated. Whatever the clarity of the outcome, each party may place upon it
an approximate value, if not a completely determinate one. The issue that
'The device of side letter is often used if one side or the other is concerned with the inclusion of a particular
provision in a public agreement would cause other investors or governments to seek parity treatment, or to
raise expectations needlessly. Such a provision is then excluded from the public document and placed in a
private one in the form of a letter or exchange of letters (termed "side letters").
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arises is: Given the alternatives among which each party had to choose, and
the values of the associated outcomes, does the agreement provide a good solu-
tion.37 This calls for a consideration of the resulting structure of gains between
the investor and the investee state.
We have already encountered the concepts of gain and the distribution of
gains. The scope of the gains to be distributed from a MNC investment will dif-
fer from project to project and from industry to industry. In export-oriented
mining projects, for example, the traditional agreement on the distribution of
gains has tended to center on the distribution of the proceeds from gross value
of the exports alone, i.e. increase in the retained value from a given export
value free on board. In contemporary agreements, however, what matters is
the over-all distribution of benefits from exports, i.e. from the final consumer
value of commodity exports, including margins accruing to forward linkage
operations such as shipping, processing, fabricating, distribution and
marketing.
Issues as to the fairness of the distribution naturally come up for discus-
sion. Some of the notions relevant to the determination of the fairness are the
retained value concept; retained value as a proportion of export earnings; and
the internal rate of return. There is a form of social cost-benefit analysis in all
these measuring concepts, which also have their limitations. Among the gener-
al policy indices which come into play in the social cost-benefit exercise are the
following: the extent of host country policy control over the project and its
general compatibility with national development objectives; contribution to
employment and upgrading of skills in the economy; improvement and spread
of technology in host country; financial gains from the project, including reve-
nue from tax and dividends vis-A-vis capital outflow in the form of dividends,
fees for management and technical services, royalties for use of technology;
import bill for machinery, spare parts and raw materials vis-A-vis the volume of
exports or foreign exchange savings on import-substitution goods; net gains
from external loans, i.e. the credit vis-A-vis repayment and servicing obliga-
tions; the impact of all these capital outflows on the balance-of-payments of
host country; and the impact of fiscal incentives on national income.
In all this, it should be emphasized that each party has an interest in arriv-
ing at a solution that is quite fair to the other. If an agreement has a chance of
being durable, it is important that it be founded on reciprocal advantage. If a
party, by hard or even dishonest bargaining, succeeds in getting the other to
accept an agreement providing an outcome only slightly above the latter's
minimum disposition, a slight shift in the relative power of the two parties may
well cause the agreement to be rejected by that party. We are now in a position
to consider the various factors affecting the outcome of negotiations, in par-
ticular the distribution of fairs between the parties.
"SAWYER & GUETZKOW. supra note 10, at 488.
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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS
The nature of the distribution of gains is a function of a party's relative
bargaining position within an over-all bargaining situation. The latter concept
describes the interaction among all those factors which affect the party's abili-
ty to make choices in such a way as to maximize his advantage. One is
therefore led to an examination of the various factors determining the relative
bargaining positions of host governments and MNC's, including an evaluation
of the bargaining skills available to each party in the bargaining process.
There are certain factors or conditions that greatly influence the negotia-
tion process in general. These may be grouped into two main categories. The
first category addresses the specific conditions under which the process takes
place. These conditions include the factors concerning the personal properties
of the parties, their thought processes, extent of their knowledge and bargain-
ing skills, their patterns of behavior and the psychological setting of the
negotiations. These may be called the behavioral factors. The second category
addresses the general background factors in existence at the outset of negotia-
tion. These factors concern the over-all environment, social, political and
economic, and relate to the physical setting. These may also be referred to as
the institutional factors. They can usually be assessed prior to the onset of
negotiations, whereas the behavioral factors consist of concurrent conditions
whose values are specific to a particular negotiating situation.3"
The behavioral factors can in turn be grouped into the following general
classes: (a) the level of the negotiations (i.e. the setting) - whether at the
highest political level, at the level of middle-level technocrats etc.; (b) whether
the proceedings are closed or open; (c) the number of negotiating parties; (d)
the number of individual participants; (e) the amount of information each par-
ty possesses about the other; (f) the amount of "stress" working on the
negotiators (e.g. the importance of the outcome, the difficulties involved);39 (g)
the timing, duration and phasing of negotiation. The importance of timing lies
in the fact that other factors such as stress, information, as well as the parties'
advantages, alternatives and preferences change during the process of negotia-
tions, with possibly serious consequences for pay-off or gains expected from
them. The background factors, on the other hand, include such items as the
broad cultural tradition of the parties or nationalities involved, the general at-
titude between the negotiating team to other officials of its government, the
level of social and economic development of the negotiating countries and
their general place in the world economic and political situation.
331d., at 490-500.
"vThe word "stress" is used to describe the possible effects upon negotiation of such psychological factors as a
constraint to reach agreement by a certain time, a high level of antagonism between the parties, threatened
detrimental actions in the event of non-agreement, importance of the negotiation, and other conditions
usually impeding agreement. SAWYER & GUETZKOW. supra note 10, at 498.
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A. Background Factors Determining the Bargaining Positions of Host
Country and Multinational Corporation
Turning specifically to negotiations with multinational corporations, ex-
perience points to some crucial background factors which tend to determine
the relative bargaining position of the host country and the MNC's. These may
be discussed under four main headings: host government philosophy and host
country environment; the strength of the MNC and related factors; the nature
of the commodity or project in question and the international setting.
Under the first heading, there are political, administrative, legal and
economic factors. Politically, one must investigate the degree of independence
or linkage of the regime with local politico-economic groupings. The political
philosophy of the Government, especially in relation to foreign capital invest-
ment; the stability and strength of the Government, and finally, the incidence
of foreign penetration and control over various productive sectors in the coun-
try are further considerations that one must investigate.
Administrative and legal factors include the quality of the bureaucracy,
especially in relation to general skill and efficiency, the extent of education and
training in the system, the quality of technical cadres to perform corporate
functions independently, factors relating to skills in negotiations and availabili-
ty of information on MNC's, which will be discussed separately under bargain-
ing skills; and the laws and regulations of the country, especially these pertain-
ing to foreign investment.
Economic factors cover such matters as dependence on foreign exchange
earnings from exports in general, and from the commodity concerned in par-
ticular, including the degree of export diversification; the position of the coun-
try in world trade of the commodity concerned; the position of the country in
world production and reserves in that commodity; the proportion of the com-
modity exported in relation to the host country's production; relationship with
the international economic system and its external economic and financial
dependency, e.g. the balance-of-payments and debt position.
Under the strength of the MNC and related factors, we must first of all
consider its international control relationships. This would cover the structure
of the oligopoly, that is, the degree of vertical and horizontal integration and
control over production and exports, shipping, processing, marketing and
distribution; the existence of cartel arrangements, including gentlemen's
agreements in the industry; oligopoly dynamics including the weakening of the
oligopoly through emergence of independent firms in the industry; position of
the particular MNC in the industry, e.g. its share of markets, raw material sup-
plies, production and processing capacity; and corporate strategies regarding
global control over raw material.
Secondly, we should consider the relationship between the MNC and the
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host country concerned. Of relevance here are the structure of the MNC in the
host country - the legal status of the subsidiary in the corporate system,
related and associated companies through interlocking directorships and
managment and technology contracts; the transnational mobility of the cor-
poration; its dependence on raw materials from the particular host country and
the possibilities of shifting to other supply sources in the short and long run;
debt-equity factors of the investment project; and the extent of investment
planned or already realized in that host country. Thirdly, the extent of support
that the MNC enjoys from its home country is to be considered.
As far as the nature of the commodity is concerned, we should investigate
the impact of the trends in supply and demand, including projection of such
trends and the importance of trade in world production of the commodity.10
Other factors relevant to an investigation are trends in demand and supply of
substitutes, income, price elasticities, elasticity of substitution and market
structure. Market structure includes the importance of formal markets and of
arm's length trading versus intra-company transactions, the geographic con-
centration of countries in production, processing, trade and consumption of
the commodity, and the nature and structure of the industry, e.g. the propor-
tion of export value of primary commodities to final consumer value in the im-
porting country; the dynamics of resource discovery and, in the case of
minerals, trends in reserves related to current production; the trend towards
massive size of capital requirements for mining projects, i.e. increasing the
capital investment required per metric ton of production of the specific com-
modity concerned.
There are also factors associated with the international setting of the
negotiations which may be equally relevant. These include possible repercus-
sions of the rhetoric and achievements of political liberation and decoloniza-
tion, and other matters linked up with a changing world political and economic
liberalization to accompany political independence, culminating in demands
for a new international economic order, in juxtaposition to the steadily grow-
ing power of MNC's in all spheres of activity; the impact of international
organizations such as the United Nations and its various agencies (especially
UNCTAD, IMF, IBRD) and the non-aligned movement; the scope of interna-
tional commodity agreements; the strength of producers' associations;
multipolarization of the world economy; preferential schemes extended to a
particular group of countries by certain importing countries and other policies
imposed by consumer or importing countries; and potential or real sanctions
imposed by home governments of MNC's and/or international institutions on
countries which embark on policies such as expropriation.
'in the specific case of trends in supply and demand, the market situation would tend to oscillate between
the two extremes of bilateral monopoly and pure competition, the former describing the situation in which
one seller is the only producer or owner of a particular commodity, and the buyer is the only one interested
in acquiring it. Between the two positions there are many other cases with different degrees of bargaining
and market influence on price information, e.g. the case of bilateral oligopoly, in which only a small number
of sellers have access to goods which interest only a few buyers.
[Vol. 18:3
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All the factors outlined above constitute no more than a useful indicative
checklist, for it is impossible to assign definitive values or weights to factors
which are, in their very nature, in continuous change. They are, in any case,
inexhaustive. Furthermore, some of the factors may have no relevance to par-
ticular negotiations.
B.. Behavioral Factors: Bargaining Skills
Although the structure of the industry, the requirements of the particular
firm, economic and political forces in the host country and other background
factors set boundaries on the kinds of agreement that can be concluded, some
of the behavioral factors mentioned above are nevertheless significant deter-
minants of the kind of outcome that is reached within those boundaries.' Here
we shall single out bargaining skills and make a few comments on them.
Bargaining skills describe the personal capacity of the bargainer to shift
the elements of the bargaining situation in his favor. As indicated in the intro-
ductory part of this paper, there are three aspects to the acquisition of such
skills. These aspects are mastery over the technical issues often raised in the
foreign investment process, acquisition of information on the prospective
MNC partner, and negotiating style and techniques. It goes without saying
that it is an advantage in negotiations to be more intelligent, more skilled in ar-
gument, more knowledgeable, in addition to having more economic resources.
The type of information on the MNC required for negotiations will ex-
tend to its global network, objectives, methods and practices, and investment
size. Success in this area, however, is a function of the extent of exchange of in-
formation among concerned countries, in view of the transnational nature of
MNC operations. With regard to negotiating style and techniques, attention
may be drawn to personal qualities such as diplomacy, affability, forcefulness,
intelligence, and the ability to recognize and seize opportunities during
negotiations.
The personality of the negotiator may be more or less important depend-
ing upon the circumstances. It seems that it would be more important when in-
formation is lacking or when the objective advantages of the negotiating party
are relatively modest. One common personality characteristic is the author-
itarian type. Authoritarian personalities are thought to change their attitudes
less readily. Whereas, non-authoritarians might reverse their positions more
easily if additional information became available. In other words, the former is
less willing to compromise. Another personality characteristic is ego control.
Persons with such characteristic are more predisposed to respond to prestige
suggestions. On the whole, whether authoritarianism is generally functional or
dysfunctional to the process of negotiation would seem to depend upon
'SMITH & WELLS, supra note I, at 153.
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whether the particular negotiating situation calls for rigidity or flexibility. Dif-
ferent bargaining situations may demand varying individual characteristics.
However, the personality aspect of bargaining skills is not the only deter-
mining circumstance. The negotiating experience, at least in respect of mastery
over technical substantive matters, can be taught or acquired to a very large
extent through training. Some academicians have attempted to devise courses
on negotiations patterned after simulated negotiations. Others propose assign-
ing prospective young negotiators to negotiating teams just to listen, to get the
"feel" of negotiations, and in that way acquire some experience. But, as
Charles Lipton aptly states that there is simply no substitute for actual ex-
perience in. negotiations. 2
CONCLUSION
In this paper the author has sought to provide a conceptual framework for
case studies by outlining the main stages of negotiations, indicating some of
the main factors affecting the relative bargaining position of the parties to ne-
gotiations with multinational corporations, and providing indices for evaluat-
ing the resulting structure of the distribution of gains from such negotiations.
Parties to a conflict resort to negotiations when they have varying degrees
of power, but not absolute power, over each other to force a decision. As long
as both parties consider that the benefits of resolving the conflict through
negotiations are greater than the perceived benefits of resolving it through
some other means, negotiations are likely to be preferred to other conflict
resolution procedures. In the specific case of multinational corporations,
negotiations typically arise when the host government seeks to establish a
specific agreement tailored to the needs and peculiarities of particular projects,
rather than leave them to operate under the general laws of the country. In
any case, such laws are generally deficient in tackling the multifarious issues
that present themselves for resolution in the foreign investment process.
Negotiations with MNC's do not only come into play at the pre-establishment
phase of projects. Re-negotiations often become necessary as a result of fun-
damental changes in the circumstances of a project, or as a result of a general
change in political orientation.
Negotiations have several phases, of which the bargaining process is the
most intense. The latter describes the actual process by which the terms and
conditions of a potential agreement, including the structure of distribution of
gains, are arrived. This involves a great deal of preparation - feasibility
studies, establishing priorities and objectives, collecting information on the
other party, drafting proposed agreements, formulating the agenda and com-
posing the negotiating team. In all these preparations, the government's over-
'LIPTON.supra note 9, at 5.
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all strategy in negotiations with MNC's would be to force the latter to
negotiate on the government's own grounds, and not the other way around.
Upon completion of the preparatory stage of the bargaining process
comes the actual business of sitting at the bargaining table to negotiate a
definite agreement. We have outlined some of the basic strategies that parties
use in proceedings at the table. These are: making and receiving proposals,
communicating to and persuading the other party, maintaining a balance be-
tween flexibility and firmness in bargaining, timing adjournments and control-
ling publicity.
We have also highlighted some common negotiating techniques to which
parties frequently resort at the bargaining table. Threats, fait accomplis,
brinkmanship and intransigence, "non-negotiable" terms, delay, public pro-
paganda, the linkage of fairness to stability of agreements, the fear of conces-
sions leading to "dangerous" precedents, alleged lack of authority, precondi-
tions, bluffing, outright deception and lies, linking non-cognate issues, the
"salami" tactic, the tough guy-nice guy syndrome, and the tactic of splitting
the difference were all mentioned and discussed briefly. What all these bargain-
ing tactics have in common is the attempt to generate and exploit uncertainties
in the other party's thinking about the nature of the situation.
Out of the bargaining process emerges an outcome, which we have as-
sumed to be one of agreement rather than deadlock. The agreement has to be
placed within the general context of applicable laws and administrative regula-
tions, which are expected to supply gaps and provide interpretations missing
from the formal document.
An inevitable question about outcomes concerns the value or fairness of
the agreement reached, and this calls for a consideration of the resulting struc-
ture of gains between the investor and the investee state. In the paper we have
indicated some of the notions relevant to the determination of fairness, such as
the retained value concept, retained value as a proportion of earnings, and the
internal rate of return. Some of the general policy indices which come into play
in the social cost-benefit exercise implied in these notions have also been men-
tioned.
Finally, the paper analyzes some of the various factors affecting the out-
come of negotiations, in particular the distribution of gains between the par-
ties. We have asserted that the nature of the distribution of gains is a function
of a party's relative bargaining position within an over-all bargaining situation,
which is in turn affected by background institutional and behavioral factors.
Among the most important of the latter set of factors is the bargaining skill of
negotiators. It is this which helps to shift the elements of the bargaining situa-
tion in a party's favor within the boundaries set by the institutional factors.
As stated earlier the three aspects to the acquisition of such skills are
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mastery over the technical issues often raised in the foreign investment pro-
cess, acquisition of information on the prospective MNC partner, and of
negotiating style and technique. The personality of the negotiator may be
more or less important depending upon factors such as availability of informa-
tion, degree of stress and the objective advantages of the negotiating party.
Bargaining skills can largely be acquired through appropriate training
methods, including simulation, "in-service" observance of negotiators at work,
and actual participation in negotiations. Host states should therefore take
more interest in the training of their nationals in the area of negotiations by
buttressing the above methods with academic courses, workshops, seminars,
and advisory services obtainable within the United Nations system and other
appropriate international organizations.
In respect of negotiations with MNC's, the background factors have been
discussed under four main headings: host government philosophy and host
country environment; the strength of the MNC and related factors; the nature
of the commodity in question; and the international setting. In this connection,
one may assert that the future bargaining strength of the developing world lies
partly in the fact that it is endowed with considerable but as yet little exploited
natural resources in demand in traditional markets in the advanced countries
and elsewhere, partly in the potential markets which integrated national
development, in addition to multinational co-operation, can create. It must
therefore be central to their strategy in international economic relations to
secure by negotiation the most effective combination of imported components
of growth in return for access to the region's natural resources, domestic
market opportunities, as well as fiscal and other economic incentives.
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